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Part 1. ‘Coherence’ and ‘Unity’ 
 
1.1. What is coherence?  
 
Coherence—whether understood narrowly as compatibility between constituents of a textual 
world, or quite broadly as a regulative principle applying to all areas of text production and 
reception—is a constitutive feature of textuality.2 While there is much disagreement about the 
concept, all agree that “coherence” is a fundamental ingredient of a “text” as such—or at least 
of its meaningful experience. It is an expectation brought to anything that might be considered 
a ‘text,’ though it is not found in equal measure in every text.3 The degree and kind of coherence 
expected of a text (and the effort exerted to satisfy such expectations) depend on a variety of 
factors.4  
This article sketches an anatomy of issues representing key points of debate, differences 
in approach, and decisions that must be made in the attempt to understand coherence and 
incoherence in ancient Jewish literature. One of several key difficulties in assessing the 
                                               
1 For the purposes of this essay, we are using ‘ancient Jewish literature’ as catch-all for the literatures of 
ancient Israel and ancient Judaism before the Mishna. 
2 “[W]e consider a text to be a monological stretch of written language that shows coherence” (T. Sanders 
and J. Sanders, “Text and Text Analysis,” in Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics [ed. K. Brown; 2nd ed.; 
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006], 597–607 at 598). For coherence as a “regulative principle,” see K. Adamzik, 
Textlinguistik: Eine einführende Darstellung (Niemeyer: Tübingen, 2004), 58–59; and consider, by contrast, the 
discussion of regulative and constitutive principles in R. de Beaugrande and W. Dressler, Introduction to Text 
Linguistics (London: Longman, 1981), 11. The latter relate coherence to the “ways in which the components of 
the TEXTUAL WORLD, i.e. the configuration of CONCEPTS and RELATIONS which underlie the surface text, are 
mutually accessible and relevant” (4). “In general, by coherence is meant that the constituents of a unit will be 
semantically compatible with each other” (J. Beekman, J. Callow, and M. Kopesec, The Semantic Structure of 
Written Communication (5th ed.; Dallas: SIL International, 1981) 21. The latter further specify referential 
coherence, structural coherence, and situational coherence, which includes emotive, tonal, or connotational 
coherence.  
3 E. Blum: “Kohärenz ist prinzipiell gegeben, sofern eine sprachliche Größe als Text rezipiert wird. Die 
Fragestellung, ob ein Text Kohärenz aufweist, wäre mithin widersinnig. Vielmehr kann es grundsätzlich nur 
darum gehen, von welcher Art und welcher intensität die Kohärenz auf den verschiedenen Textebenen ist. [Mit 
„Textebenen“ sind hier einerseits Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik gemeint, andererseits die Oberflächenstruktur 
und Tiefenstruktur der Texte].” (“Von Sinn und Nutzen der Kategorie „Synchronie“ in der Exegese,” in 
Grundfragen der historischen Exegese [ed. W. Oswald and K. Weingart; FAT 95; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2015], 55–68, at 67). De Beaugrande and Dressler: “To some degree, cohesion and coherence could themselves 
be regarded as operational goals without whose attainment other discourse goals may be blocked. However, text 
users normally exercise TOLERANCE towards products whose conditions of occurrence make it hard to uphold 
cohesion and coherence altogether…notably in casual conversation” (Introduction to Text Linguistics, 7). Cf. 
Adamzik: “Es gibt denn doch eine gewisse Toleranz gegenüber inhaltlich nur schwach (oder auch gar nicht) 
verknüpften Teiltexten, und Sprachbenutzer rechnen mit unterschiedlich ausgeprägter Kohärenz auch bei 
Gebrauchstexten” (Textlinguistik, 128–29).  
4 This includes, not least, the type of text under consideration See, e.g., A. Samely with P. Alexander, R. 
Bernasconi, and R. Hayward, Profiling Jewish Literature in Antiquity: An Inventory from Second Temple Texts 
to the Talmuds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23; M. Heath, Unity in Greek Poetics (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1989), 1.  
 
problem of “coherence” (or its absence) in the Hebrew Bible and ancient Jewish literature 
concerns the fact, just mentioned, that the definition of “coherence” is itself contested, both in 
biblical studies and in other disciplines.5 Within text-linguistic research, for example, the 
concept of “coherence” has been understood in a wide variety of ways and with diverse 
applications, ranging from the very narrow (closely approximating the notion of grammatical 
and lexical cohesion)6 to the very broad (“coherence” as a comprehensive category of 
understanding that applies to all essential aspects of a text).7 Differences in the scope of the 
concept tend to yield quite different descriptions and conclusions.  
On this question of definition also turns the debated issue of the locus of coherence: 
internal (“intra-,”  “inner-,” and “inter-textual”) and/or external (“extra-textual”).8  Put as a 
question, is coherence properly a feature inherent to texts, or is it a property granted to it by 
readers?  Outside of linguistic research, the former conclusion is disputed. The latter is not. 
This dispute requires some clarification. 
In the first place, there are limitations peculiar to written communication that require 
readers to participate in coherence construction. The principle of selection by which writers 
choose which events and things to pronounce and which to imply accounts for the 
fundamentally gapped quality of all writing. Rendering a complete account is impossible.9 One 
could describe, in endless detail, the features of a character or object or the contours of an event 
                                               
5 On the lack of terminological clarity in biblical studies, see M. Z. Brettler, “The ‘Coherence’ of Ancient 
Texts,” in Gazing on the Deep: Ancient Near Eastern and Other Studies in Honor of Tzvi Abusch (ed. J. Stackert 
et al; Bethesda: CDL, 2010), 411–419 at 412.  
6 M.A.K. Halliday and R. Hassan, Cohesion in English (London: Longman, 1976). 
7 For the broad view, see esp. K. Brinker, Linguistische Textanalyse: Eine Einführung in Grundbegriffe 
und Methoden (5th ed.; Grundlagen der Germanistik 29; Erich Schmidt: Berlin, 2001), 18, and Adamzik, 
Textlinguistik, who understand coherence “as a comprehensive concept that incorporates both linguistic and 
conceptual, as well as functional and even situational aspects—that is, in and between the individual dimensions 
one must always examine to what extent coherence is present and how it is constituted or how it is disturbed. I 
regard it as a break in coherence even when expressions that are conceptually quite compatible are juxtaposed in 
a conflicting stylistic register; if the theme or even a specific expression does not fit the situation. […] I do not 
regard coherence, therefore, as an independent dimension, but rather as a ‘regulative principle’ of text production 
and text reception” (Textlinguistik, 58). “The question of to what degree coherence is present must be 
examined/decided not only for the cohesively (dis-)connected linguistic signs and with reference to the 
dimensions of situation, theme, and function; rather, coherence (or the rupture of coherence) can also be present 
between the various dimensions...” (Textlinguistik, 59). See also G. Fritz, Kohärenz: Grundfragen der 
linguistischen Kommunikationsanalyse (TBL 164; Tübingen: Narr, 1982), 1–12 (esp. 10); J. Petöfi, “Theoretische 
Forschung. Aspekte der Textkohärenz, Sprachunterricht”, in Text, Kontext, Interpretation (ed. K. Dorfmüller-
Karpusa and J. Petöfi; Hamburg: Buske, 1981), 235–85, at 236. For mediating views, see de Beaugrande and 
Dressler (n. 1 above); W.-D. Krause, Textsorten: Kommunikationslinguistische und konfrontative Aspekte (SST 
33; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000), for whom coherence is “the expression of a conceptual connection, 
primarily grounded thematically, between propositions expressed in language. This connection is naturally related 
to the meaning of a text and therefore to problems of understanding, but it is not thereby identical to those…” 
(57); and others discussed in Adamzik, Textlinguistik, 55.  
8 See Adamzik, Textlinguistik, 54–59; de Beaugrande and Dressler, Introduction, 6–7; Krause, Textsorten, 
49–52, 58; cf. C. J. Fillmore, “Linguistics as a Tool for Discourse Analysis,” in Handbook of Discourse Analysis: 
Vol I: Disciplines of Discourse (ed. T. A. van Dijk; London: Academic, 1985), 11–39 at 11. 	
9 R. Ingarden describes this as the fundamental limitation of written communication (Der Streit um die 
Existenz der Welt, vol. II/1 (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), 220; see also at n.12 below. W. Iser stresses that 
gaps not only pose challenges to understanding, they are also the basic inducement to communication (The Act of 
Reading, 166–67; 183–84). On all the issues discussed here see L. Doležel, “Possible Worlds and Literary 
Fictions,” in Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts, and Sciences (ed. A. Sture; Research in Text Theory 14; Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 1988), 221–42 and, especially, Wolfgang Iser, “Indeterminacy and the Reader’s Response in Prose 
Fiction,” in Aspects of Narrative, English Institute Essays (ed. by J. Hillis Miller; New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1971), 1–45. 
 
or argument without achieving a complete description without gaps and blanks. The 
“involvement of the reader or spectator as accomplices or collaborators is essential in the 
curious situation of artistic communication.”10 Gap-filling is one of the ways that readers 
continually (often unconsciously) contribute to the coherence of the communications that they 
receive. It is the responsibility of readers to fill many of those gaps, a tacit responsibility neither 
offered nor demanded in any explicit way. Fulfilling that responsibility is a powerful act of 
coherence–building.11   
The contributions that readers make to a text’s coherence seem innumerable both in 
frequency and kind. For example, in Genesis 12.4–5 we read: “4Abram went, just as YHWH 
told him, and Lot went with him. Abram was seventy-five years old when he departed Haran. 
5Abram took his wife Sarai and his nephew Lot, and all the stuff that they had gathered, and 
the persons whom they had acquired in Haran, and they set out to go to the land of Canaan.” 
Persons and things in the story (‘existents’) are assumed to persist. The ‘Lot’ of verse 4 is the 
same person specified in verse 5 as “his brother’s son,” or so one naturally assumes. Were the 
two persons different characters, one would expect the writers would have revealed it in some 
way. Absent such a revelation, the reader grants continuity of identity to the existent ‘Lot.’ The 
same applies to ‘Abram,’ ‘Sarai,’ and ‘Haran’; all three having been introduced at the end of 
chap 11. Another common type of reader contribution is ‘event causality.’ Again, we read in 
Gen 16.6: “Abram said to Sarai, ‘Your slave–girl is in your power; do to her as you please,’ so 
Sarai was cruel to her, and she ran away from her.” It is natural to assume that Hagar ran away 
because of Sarah’s treatment of her. The writers neither imply nor say as much. It is assumed 
that the juxtaposition of clauses is a sufficient indicator.12 Of course, some readers are more 
aware of their own contributions to the reading process than others. Academic readers, in 
particular, are trained to observe gaps and blanks and to restrain the impulse to fill them too 
quickly.13 Good reading calls for such restraint, since good writers will exploit readerly 
impulses. Even good readers can stumble, though. A cultivated restraint can become a reading 
flaw if exercised stubbornly, erratically, or in a historically inappropriate way.14 
                                               
10 L. Nelson Jr., “The Fictive Reader and Literary Self-Reflectiveness,” in The Disciplines of Criticism: 
Essays on Literary Theory, Interpretation, and History, Honoring René Welek on the Occasion of his Sixty-fifth 
Birthday (eds. P. Demetz, T. Green, and L. Nelson, Jr.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 174.  
11 S. Chatman describes a ‘story’ as “the continuum of events presupposing the total set of all conceivable 
details” (Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film [Ithaca and New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1978], 28). Iser makes the same point about all texts: “By grouping together the written parts of the text, 
we enable them to interact, we observe the direction in which they are leading us, and we project onto them the 
consistency which we, as readers, require. This ‘gestalt’ must inevitably be colored by our own characteristic 
selection process. For it is not given by the text itself; it arises from the meeting between the written text and the 
individual mind of the reader with its own particular history of experience, its own consciousness, its own outlook” 
(“The Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach,” New Literary History 3/2 [1972]: 289). In their 
conception, the ‘story’ is a composite of written and imagined elements and therefore is never the same twice. 
This is one of the unique pleasures of rereading.  
12 Ingarden refers to any lack of identicality between the contours of a work and its realization by the reader 
as “places of indeterminacy” (The Literary Work of Art [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973], 29–
30, 267, 332–6, etc.). Iser builds on Ingarden’s observation, exploring how gap-filling is not only an act of 
completion but of combination. “It is only when the schemata of the text are related to one another that the 
imaginary object can begin to be formed, and it is the blanks that get this connecting operation under way” (Act 
of Reading, 183–86 quote at 183). 
13 This is one facet of Ingarden’s ‘aesthetic experience,’ which is to be distinguished from ‘mere looking’ 
or ‘mere reading’ (“Artistic & Aethetic Values,” British Journal of Aesthetics 4/3 [1964], 198–213). 
14 In one recent study on “Pentateuchal Coherence,” Jeffery Stackert proposed that Exod 4.2 and 17 
represent “contradictory narrative claims.” According to Stackert, in 4.2 “Moses possesses a rod that Yahweh 
then instructs him to use,” whereas in 4.17 “the deity gives such a rod to Moses, implying that Moses did not 
possess a rod previously.” Stackert assumes the persistence of the existents ‘Moses’ and ‘YHWH’ but, in an act of 
 
    
Granting all this, an over-emphasis on coherence as a contribution of readers is liable to 
promote a serious misunderstanding. On the one hand, coherence clearly relates to mental 
processes impossible apart from the active involvement of readers. From this standpoint, a 
reader seeks out and thereby constitutes coherence.15 On the other hand, these mental processes 
are bound to the physical text as a functional whole that represents the embodiment of an 
intentional, situational, communicative act, a strategy of communication manifested in tightly 
related features (cohesion, structure, boundedness, referentiality, etc). From this standpoint, a 
reader finds or re-creates the coherence encoded within the text. A reader does not create it de 
novo.16  
Coherence, then, requires cooperation between text producers and consumers.17 It is a 
communicative transaction that assumes and requires the participation of writers and readers 
and is delivered in the form of an aural or physical object (the text). So, although coherence is 
a “text-notion,” it is “not a mere feature of texts, but rather the outcome of cognitive processes 
                                               
restraint, does not do so for the staff.  Then, eschewing restraint, he perceives and fills gaps in 4.17: “take in your 
hand this [brand new] staff [since you lack one].” (“Pentateuchal Coherence and the Science of Reading,” in The 
Formation of the Pentateuch: Bridging the Academic Cultures of Europe, Israel, and North America (ed. J. Gertz 
et al; FAT 111; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 253–68, at 257). Stackert’s broader goal is to “apply the findings 
of empirical research on reading comprehension, textual cohesion and coherence, and cognition especially in the 
fields of psychology, linguistics, and education to the question of how readers understand pentateuchal texts as 
unified and coherent” (ibid., 253–54).  On the limitations of empirical reading-research for understanding bona 
fide literature as opposed to small ‘textoids,’ see A. Grosser, M. Gernsbacher, and S. Goldman, “Cognition,” in 
Discourse as Structure and Process, vol 1 (ed. T. van Dijk; London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 1997), 
292–319, esp. 312–13; A. Samely, “Jewish Studies and Reading,” in ‘Let the Wise Listen and Add to Their 
Learning’. Festschrift for Günter Stemberger on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday (eds. G. Langer and C. 
Cordoni; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016), 767–771; J. Petöfi, “Towards an Empirically Motivated Grammatical Theory 
of Verbal Texts,” in Studies in Text Grammar (eds. J. Petöfi and Hannes Reiser; Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 
1973), 205–275; H. van Oostendorp and R. A. Zwaan, Naturalistic Text Comprehension (Norwood NJ: Ablex, 
1994). 
15 “... kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass ... die Kohärenzherstellung auch eine vom Rezipienten zu 
leistende Aufgabe ist: er sucht und stiftet selbst Zusammenhänge” (Adamzik, Textlinguistik, 128–29). “Coherence 
is considered a mental phenomenon; it is not an inherent property of a text under consideration” (Sanders and 
Sanders, “Text and Text Analysis,” 599). “[T]he dominant view has come to be that the connectedness of 
discourse is a characteristic of the mental representation of the text rather than of the text itself. The connectedness 
thus conceived is often called coherence” (ibid., 592).  “… coherence is something that the reader creates in 
dialogue with the text—it is ‘a mental phenomenon’ ” (Brettler, “The ‘Coherence’ of Ancient Texts, 414 with 
embedded quote from Gernsbacher and Givón, “Introduction: Coherence as a Mental Entity,” in Coherence in 
Spontaneous Text [ed. Gernsbacher and Givón; Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 1995], vii). Coherence “is properly an 
achievement of the reader, even as it is highly dependent on a text’s cohesive ties.” (Stackert, “Pentateuchal 
Coherence and the Science of Reading,” 254). 
16 Susan Sontag in her famous essay “Against Interpretation” took aim at all attempts to find meaning in 
texts. “Interpretation [is] based on the highly dubious theory that a work of art is composed of items of content” 
(Against Interpretation and Other Essays [New York: Macmillan, 1966], 6).  Like Sontag, M. Brettler contends 
that “coherence is something that the reader creates,” that “coherence depends on readers” (M. Z. Brettler, “The 
‘Coherence’ of Ancient Texts,” 414, 418). Similarly, E. van Wolde attempts to draw a sharp line between 
‘cohesion’ and ‘coherence.’ She identifies the first as a feature of texts, the second as a mental construct of readers, 
which differs from the overlapping qualities of the two in most text-linguistic research (E. van Wolde “The 
Creation of Coherence,” Semeia 81 [1998]: 159–174). We are not suggesting that Brettler and van Wolde agree 
with Sontag’s assertion that all efforts at interpretation violate works of art and should be given up; we merely 
observe that all three have removed ‘meaning’ and perforce ‘coherence’ from the work. 
17 “A text does not make sense by itself, but rather by the interaction of text-presented knowledge with 
people’s stored knowledge of the world.” (de Beaugrande and Dressler, 6).  
 
among text users.”18  For the present purposes, we will take “coherence” in a limited sense as 
referring to the compatibility between constituents of a text.19 Within this framework, 
“coherence” may apply to conceptual connectivity at multiple levels or extents of text, from 
the proposition, clause, and sentence (microstructural coherence) up to the complete text 
(macrostructural coherence).20 While readers perform an indispensable role in constituting that 
coherence, coherence cannot be separated from the text as a communicative strategy. 
At stake in this debate over the meaning of “coherence”—and in particular the false 
dichotomy between inherent textual properties and the contribution of the reader within a 
communication-transaction—is the degree to which the coherence-construal of an individual 
reader is subject to critical evaluation; i.e. how and to what extent the intuitions and underlying 
assumptions of readers may be determined by historical analysis to be correct or incorrect, 
appropriate or inappropriate, valid or invalid, successful or deficient. Given the competing 
understandings and applications of coherence as a concept, it comes as no surprise that a wide 
variety of heterogenous phenomena are associated with its establishment or rupture, as we will 
discuss below.  
 
 
1.2. The Relationship to “Unity”  
 
Notions of “unity” in Hebrew Bible scholarship in particular, add a further layer of 
misunderstanding. “Unity” and “coherence” sometimes appear to be used interchangeably. 
Their conflation, however, can again lead to descriptive confusion and obscure fundamental 
differences in the claims, analytical procedures, methods, and assumptions attending different 
modes of scholarly reading.  This confusion is complicated by the fact that, like the term 
“coherence,” “unity” is taken to mean quite different things in this discussion. As a 
consequence, one often observes a slippage or lack of conceptual clarity in the application of 
the term, especially in relation to the notion of “coherence.” Three uses of the term “unity” are 
common in scholarly parlance. 
 
1. Unity as a claim about authorship. For many scholars, the term “unity” is definitionally tied 
to an historical judgment regarding authorship and production, though the specific model of 
                                               
18 Ibid. 6–7; “The process of constituting meaning can be ... described as a continuously progressive 
selection—directed by the purpose of the speech—from the possibilities of effect and function relating to the 
given elements whose relevance is known to the speakers; this process results eventually in the individualization 
of the functions normatively or facultatively given, defined by appropriate categories, and formally determined 
by their position in the language system, which is directed toward the communicationally relevant, intentional and 
situational adequacy of what is to be conveyed in a linguistic transaction.” (S. J. Schmidt, Bedeutung und Begriff. 
Zur Fundierung einer sprachphilosophischen Semantik [Braunschweig: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, 1969], 139 cited 
by Iser, Act of Reading, 183–4) 
19 de Beaugrande and Dressler, Introduction, 4; Krause, Textsorten, 57. “The main abstract condition on 
local coherence is that the complex propositions, expressed by the respective clauses or sentences, denote facts of 
some possible world that are related, conditionally or by inclusion.” (W. Kintsch and T. van Dijk, Strategies of 
Discourse Comprehension [New York : Academic Press, 1983], 15). 
20 On coherence and structure, see Krause, Textsorten,  57–58 who notes that the concept of coherence 
stands in tight relationship to the “structuredness” (Strukturierheit) of all texts, and thus that structure and 
coherence can be seen as two specific ways of looking at the same problem. On macrostructure in relation to 
coherence, see especially van Dijk, Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse 
(London: Longman, 1997), 93–129; 130–63; idem, Some Aspects of Text Grammars (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), 
34–129; 130–162; 273–309. See also Kintsch and van Dijk, Strategies of Discourse Comprehension, 79–80; “The 
themes or macrostructures … define the global coherence of the discourse. Locally, coherence must be established 
by the interpretation of relations between sentences, the so-called connection relations” (90).  
 
authorship—and consequently, the specific features of unity—may vary.21 “Unity” can be used 
strictly to denote the product of singular authorship, i.e. an independent literary unit that is the 
product of one author, mind, or hand, to the exclusion of composite entities. A “composite 
text” may thus stand in definitional opposition to a “unified text.”22 Alternatively, “unity” can 
be used to describe the additive or combinatory work of an author/redactor. By this definition, 
one might regard a composite text that appears to be the product of multiple authors or to attest 
to a long compositional development as a “unity” or “unified text,” in the sense of displaying 
a certain compatibility between constituent elements attributable to the intention of a later 
writer or writers.23 Some speak of “secondary” as opposed to “primary” unity, “redactional 
unity.”24 In such cases, one might meaningfully speak of the “unity” of a complex, multilayered 
work, without a claim of unitary authorship. Regardless of the exact model of authorship, 
“unity” as an authorial notion is taken to be either supported or denied on the basis of the 
reader’s experience of in/coherence.  
 
2. Unity as a judgment about textual features.  For others, however, “unity” represents an 
analytic judgment about the internal semantic compatibility or consistency of a text, without 
expressing commitment to, and thus independent of, any particular conception of authorship 
or reconstruction of a text’s historical development. Such an authorially-agnostic claim of 
“unity” applied to a text is neither permanently nor necessarily ahistorical, even though 
deductions about historical production are procedurally bracketed. This understanding of 
“unity” can be very close to the notion of “coherence”; both may represent statements about 
the ultimate (“global” or “macrostructural”) compatibility of textual constituents.25 Often the 
two are hierarchically ordered, with unity representing the highest-level attribution of 
coherence.  
 
3. Unity as a phenomenological postulate of all reading. There is a third sense of “unity” that 
stands in contrast to (1) and (2). In (1) and (2) “unity” represents an a posteriori conclusion or 
judgment made after having read a text. Here in (3), “unity” is an a priori assumption or 
anticipation brought to a potential text (any de facto bounded literary unit). “Unity” in this 
sense is a phenomenological postulate of all reading.26 It is what motivates a process of 
discovery and (re)construction of meaning, enabling the eventual experience of a text as 
coherent. It is what makes the meaningful experience of any text possible. It is not a judgment 
about or justification of “unity,” understood either as an historical claim about authorship or a 
claim about how a literary whole hangs together, but an expectation of the mutual compatibility 
of constituents; that the parts will relate meaningfully to the de facto whole. The quest for 
“unity” in this foundational, phenomenological sense is already presupposed to some extent in 
all the approaches discussed under (1) and (2). This expectation of unity can be disappointed, 
                                               
21  “Unity is a compositional, authorial notion; coherence [by contrast] depends on readers.” (Brettler, 
“Coherence,” 418).  
22 As it does, e.g., in Stackert, “Pentateuchal Coherence,” 253. 
23 This “compatibility” might be understood in a number of ways: the whole being governed by an overall 
strategy or plan, for example, or the whole being well-formed, hanging together, or making sense as a whole, and 
so forth. 
24 Regarding secondary unity versus primary unity, see L. Alonso Schökel, A Manual of Hebrew Poetics 
(SubBib 11; Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 1988) 189. “A later writer could take already completed pieces and 
bring them together skilfully to form a new and complex unity.” This is distinct from secondary unity as 
understood in constructivist readings: see Samely, “Jewish Studies and Reading,” 767–68.  
25 “Unity is … only one of the many criteria which we expect an utterance to satisfy if it is to be accepted 
as well-formed” (Heath, Unity in Greek Poetics, 1, for whom unity and coherence are basically interchangeable). 
26 See esp. the contribution of A. Samely to this volume; cf. idem, “Jewish Studies and Reading,” 771–75.  
 
either temporarily or permanently, by the perception of incoherence. Intuitions about whether 
and how the expectation of unity can be disappointed permanently (motivating the conclusion 
that the text is not unified) determine basic distinctions in the varieties of approach to ancient 
Jewish literature, both critical and non-critical. 
 
1.3. Differences in approach to Unity and Coherence 
 
1. Uncritical and Critical Reading. On one side of the spectrum lies uncritical reading as an 
investment of faith, in which unity is permanently assured and coherence can never be 
disappointed permanently: 
  
The investment of individuals or social groups in a text’s importance can be so high 
that any internal discontinuities or contradictions it may have are not perceived as such 
at all, or only experienced as a spur to read more closely and carefully, keeping the 
assumption of its coherence open ad infinitum. Such an attitude can be found in the 
hermeneutics of holy text cultures, including those of the Judaism that created the works 
of Midrash. In such cases the expectation of coherence is never abandoned for good, 
and therefore incapable of being disappointed. It functions as a dogma of reading. The 
labours of interpretation, and the expected complexity of devices of meaning, are raised 
to such heights that simple glaring inconsistencies, contradictions, or repetitions within 
a text are unlikely to be accepted as such.27  
 
Within critical bible reading, on the other hand, the expectation of coherence is always capable 
of being frustrated permanently.28 The license to declare the search for unity a failure and to 
evaluate further attempts to salvage coherence as historically inappropriate is an essential 
feature of the post-Enlightenment critical approach toward literature. The availability of this 
option is a necessary pre-condition for all critical inquiry that understands itself as contributing 
to the (critical) history and science of literature.  
 
2. Varieties of critical scholarship: diachronic vs. synchronic orientation.  Yet a dichotomy 
between critical and non-critical approaches does not yet suffice to capture the real contours of 
                                               
27 Samely et al., Profiling, 23–24. 
28 “If a reader assumes an attitude of ‘critical’ reading, then any initial projection of coherence is constantly 
kept under review and capable of being rescinded, should evidence to the contrary be encountered. And very 
importantly, in a critical reading the expectation that the text ‘hangs together’ is capable of being disappointed for 
good. The reader is critical because equipped with reasons for deciding to stop looking for unity, and therefore 
giving up the attempt of understanding the text. This option must always be available to the modern scholar 
reading ancient sources. This despite the risk of ‘missing’ the coherence which might have been experienced by 
ancient readers, or of applying a modern standard of expected coherence which is anachronistic for ancient texts” 
(Samely et al., Profiling, 23). W. Richter goes further and asserts that the extent of an ancient Israelite literary 
work can never be assumed as a given on the basis of de facto boundaries, but has to be proven through literary-
critical methods. For this reason such methods are procedurally primary. Before anything else can be done, one 
must pose the question of authorial unity by compiling a list of features that speak against the unity of a text and 
applying that list to the text to determine what is “original.” “Eine als ein Werk überlieferte Größe kann also in 
sich verschiedene abgeschlossene Werke enthalten, die auf verschiede Autoren zurückgehen und verschiedenen 
Zeiten angehören. Es sind somit nicht alle Werke israelitischen Literatur unmittelbar gegeben, sondern müssen 
zum Teil erst erschlossen werden. Diese Arbeit ist nicht in das Belieben jeden Einzelnen gestellt; man kann sie 
sich nicht ersparen, da sonst jede inhaltliche Exegese in der Luft hängt und historische Bezüge von Aussagen 
nicht erkannt werden können. Auch wenn wir nicht wüßten, daß es sich im AT so verhält, müßten wir die Frage 
nach der Einheit stellen; denn wir dürfen sie nicht als einzige Möglichkeit einfach voraussetzen, sondern müssen 
sie nachweisen” (Richter, Exegese als Literaturwissenschaft, 49).  
 
difference when it comes to coherence and/or unity in modern Hebrew Bible scholarship. For 
this, we must also recognize that the broader critical orientation toward the literatures of ancient 
Judaism includes within its purview diverse methods or approaches, with diverse inclinations 
toward questions of “unity” and “coherence.” Particularly important here are characteristic 
differences in the focus of engagement with the text between so-called “synchronic” (or 
“wholistic,” or “literary,” or “final form”) and “diachronic” (or “historical-critical” or “literary-
critical”) approaches. To take the latter first, diachronic studies tend to be, from a 
methodological standpoint, oriented toward finding evidence of disunity.29 Within the 
framework of this approach, frustrated attempts at construction of coherence are frequently 
taken as straightforward evidence of historical disunity.30 Such disunity is accounted for 
historically by appeal to various models of diachronic development. One cannot assume the 
comprehensibility of ancient works of literature as they presently stand, since any de facto 
whole may contain various self-contained works produced by diverse authors and belonging to 
different time periods.  
“Synchronic” literary approaches, which are typically (though not necessarily) focused 
on the extant form(s) of the text, on the other hand, tend to be conceptually oriented toward 
finding coherence and unity in any particular text, i.e. toward discovering the coherence 
presumed to exist within the text as an historical object.31 Both approaches have their own 
liabilities and dangers. Those oriented toward unity risk inappropriate harmonization; those 
oriented toward disunity risk missing historically appropriate strategies of coherence 
construction that may differ from one’s own intuitive expectations.32 But they differ not on the 
question of whether expectations of coherence can be permanently disappointed or unity 
broken—both are allied in principle against non-critical approaches which would deny that 
                                               
29 This is explicit in Richter, Exegese, 49 see note 28 above; cf. e.g., Stackert, “Pentateuchal Coherence,” 
268.  
30 “[C]lassical Literarkritik, with its methodological orientation toward doublets, tensions, textual 
unevenness, etc., is concentrated from the outset on the possible discovery of incoherence, which is interpreted, 
as a rule, as a sign of diachronic disunity” (Blum, “Synchronie,” 67). Blum rightly emphasizes, however, that 
incoherence and disunity do not have a one-to-one correspondence, since not every incoherence is due to 
diachronic disunity, but can represent formulations that turn out not to be contradictory in the end (ellipses, e.g.); 
divergent but nonetheless tolerated text disturbances; or a deliberate means of unified text formation. On the other 
hand, diachronically disunified texts are often brought together without notable coherence disturbances (ibid.; for 
an example see W. Tooman, “Literary Unity, Empirical Models, and the Compatibility of Synchronic and 
Diachronic Reading,” in Ezekiel: Current Debates and Future Directions [eds. W. Tooman and P. Barter; FAT I; 
Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2017], 497–512; for additional bibliography see n.79). “One must distinguish between 
synchronic ‘incoherence’ and diachronic ‘disunity’. The frequent synonymous use of the terms merely covers up 
and supports a widespread methodological short-circuiting of the process, in which the given incoherence 
phenomena are interpreted as symptoms of textual diachrony. This is doubtless a possibility; it is, however, only 
one among others (e.g., that a stylistic incoherence turns out, in a broader frame, not to be a sign of divergence; 
or to be a consciously introduced artistic device; or it is a feature simply overlooked by the primary author, etc. 
Equally to beware of is the reverse: a text that presents itself as coherent even under precise analysis is not yet 
proven thereby to be unified. That point of view would only be possible under the (easily disproved) premise that 
developmental processes which leave no traces of disruption behind are fundamentally excluded” (E. Blum, 
“Zwischen Literarkritik und Stilkritik,” in Grundfragen der historischen Exegese, 108]). 
31  “Synchrone Analysen sind konzeptionell darauf ausgerichtet aufzuspüren, worin die spezifische 
Kohärenzbildung des spezifischen Textes im Horizont seines semantischen und kommunikativen 
Gesamtprogramms besteht” (Blum, “Synchronie,” 67). 
32 Samely et al., Profiling, 23; cf. Blum, “Synchronie,” 68. “When incoherencies are assumed to be 
products of text evolution, this assumption will overwrite or ignore the creative possibilities of deliberate 
incoherence and close the door to reflection on the different standards of coherence and incoherence between 
ancient and modern readers. Likewise, when incoherence is assumed to be the deliberate product of literary 
creativity, it flattens texts into singular voices from singular times robbing them of the deliberate and dynamic 
exchanges that characterise Traditions-literatur” (Tooman, “Literary Unity,” 509). 
 
possibility as a matter of faith. They differ instead in their view of what constitutes 
(in)coherence and what may be taken as evidence against unity.33   
The criteria that count as indications of coherence or its absence depend to some extent 
on the operative definition of “unity.” If “unity” means the product of unitary authorship, to 
the exclusion of composite entities, then any evidence of composite production or development 
(which might include not only propositional contradictions, e.g., but also such features as 
differences in style, language, genre, or outlook) would, as such, demonstrate disunity, 
regardless of the global compatibility of the constituents. If, on the other hand, “unity” is 
construed in such a manner as to include composite texts (“redactional” or “secondary unity”), 
then such texts will be expected to display some of those very features otherwise seen as 
demonstrating disunity (e.g., divergent style, language, unexplained repetition, redundancies, 
and other forms of textual unevenness), on analogy perhaps to documentary films today that 
incorporate archival footage from different eras. The degree to which the notion of “unity” can 
stretch to accommodate various phenomena of incoherence—whether, indeed, the text can be 
regarded as readable at all—will depend on prior assumptions about the nature and possibilities 
of coherence in connection with “unity.” Different concepts of “unity” entail different 
tolerances for “incoherence.” The breaking point, the point at which the search for “unity” must 
be given up, therefore differs among scholars on the basis of their understanding of the nature 




Part Two: What Makes a Text “Incoherent”? 
 
2.1 Standards and their Availability  
 
This leads to crucial questions about the availability of ancient standards of coherence.34 How 
do we know what should count as evidence of “incoherence” or what constitutes 
“incompatibility” in the case of ancient literature? This question—the extent to which the 
standards of coherence appropriate to ancient literature are available or intuitive to modern 
critics––is a point of crucial difference among scholars. Some argue that ancient standards are 
readily accessible if not the same as modern standards.  Others contend that standards differ 
across cultures and times and must be learned.  
 
                                               
33 Much also depends on the heuristic value, the relative weight, and the procedural ordering of 
synchronically and diachronically oriented analytic methods. On the methodological priority of synchronic 
reading, see esp. Samely et al., Profiling, 23–25; and Blum, “Synchronie,” 68: “Gerade für eine historische, auf 
den ‚Eigensinn‘ der Texte gerichtete Exegese müsste sich von daher die methodische Priorität eine synchronen 
Wahrnehmung, die sich vorbehaltlos und nachhaltig auf den (wie auch immer) gegebenen Text einlässt, von selbst 
verstehen—sollte man meinen. Freilich ist diese methodische Priorität der synchronen Fragehinsicht nach den 
Vorstehenden nicht im Sinne eines starren Abfolgeschemas zu verstehen, sondern als methodische Positionierung 
innerhalb eines komplexen Prozesses der Urteilsbildung, der sich idealiter nach der Art eines weiderholt 
durchlaufenden Regelkreises vollzieht.” Per Richter, on the other hand, Literarkritik must have methodological 
priority because we cannot assume the boundaries of a “work” (Exegese, 49).  
34 By “standards of coherence” we mean something different than D. McNamara and J. Magliano, who use 
“standards” to refer to variations in the minimum threshold of comprehension being sought—i.e. the amount of 
effort given to maintaining coherence, which is “assumed to emerge from factors such as the reader’s purpose or 
goal for reading” rather than different conceptions of what constitutes coherence at all. (D. McNamara and J. 
Magliano, “Toward a Comprehensive Model of Comprehension,” in The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: 
Vol. 51 [ed. B. Ross; San Diego: Elsevier, 2009], 297–384 at 347). 
 
1. The standards are already known to critics. Some imply by their argumentation that 
standards are readily accessible, apparently on the basis of an assumption that standards of 
(in)coherence are “natural” or universal and remain constant across time—bound to 
conceptions of the functioning of human rationality and logic, and therefore available to critical 
thinking.35 These assumptions are often tacit and unacknowledged, but they form a 
fundamental premise of arguments that are put forward about the disunity or incoherence of 
works in the Hebrew Bible.  
 
For example, according to W. Richter in his handbook on exegetical method, the first step in 
the literary analysis of the Hebrew Bible must be the compilation of criteria that speak against 
the unity of a text, followed by the application of those criteria to determine what is “original.” 
The reason for this is again that, in the Hebrew Bible, a traditionally received whole can be 
made up of a variety of self-contained works from diverse authors and belonging to various 
times. We therefore cannot presume the unity of a work on the basis of de facto boundaries, 
but must first work these out. Otherwise, he claims, exegesis remains unhistorical and “hangs 
in the air,” since the historical connection of utterances cannot be recognized.36 This procedure, 
of course, assumes from the outset that the critic has reliable knowledge of the historically 
appropriate standards of coherence and unity.37 This assumption prevails in most of the existing 
handbooks.38   
 
In biblical studies, exegetical handbooks itemize lengthy menus of incoherencies.  In his Old 
Testament Exegesis, for example, Odil Hannes Steck catalogues the following as types of 
“literary disunity”: doublets, multiple transmissions, secondary brackets, tensions in syntax or 
vocabulary, incomprehensible textual corruptions, differences in manner of speech and style, 
impossible parallelism, differences in historical background, theological assertions, phrases, 
and linguistic peculiarities that are not aligned with the (deduced) historical context, tensions 
and unevenness of content, and elements atypical of a genre.39  Richter lists the following 
criteria: doubling and repetition (on various text-levels: units, segments, sentences, clauses or 
word groups), tensions (incompatible tensions and contradictions, as well as tensions in 
personal and place names that differ, as well as syntactical breaks [e.g., unmotivated change in 
subject]. Other signs of “inauthenticity” are: the appearance or absence of similarly constructed 
sentences within a segment, and the relative predominance of abstract versus concrete 
lexemes.40  Of course, these phenomena are not limited to biblical literature. Second Temple 
                                               
35 As Samely (“Jewish Studies and Reading,” 766) points out, there are actually two options: either one 
assumes “a fundamental cultural resemblance” between the contexts of modern scholars and the ancient text 
producers, or one assumes that standards are universal; cf. idem, Profiling, 17. 
36 Richter, Exegese als Literaturwissenschaft, 49 (see n. 28 above).  
37 See the similar criticism in J. Berman, Inconsistency in the Torah: Ancient Literary Convention and the 
Limits of Source Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 275. 
38 Although with nuance in Steck, Old Testament Exegesis (2nd ed.; trans. J. Nogalski; Atlanta: Scholars, 
1998), 47 (= Exegese des Alten Testaments [14th ed.; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1999], 46). 
39 Steck, Old Testament Exegesis, 9, 39–43, 54–57, 67, 76, 139. Instances of incoherence, for Steck, are 
indicators of a scribe’s attempt to “expand, enlarge, and reorder” an older version of a text (48). It should be noted 
that Steck carefully considers the limitations inherent in the indicators listed above (esp., 55–57). 
40 Note that, while repetition and redundancy figure prominently in lists of incoherence phenomena in 
biblical studies, other linguistic studies consider recurrence or redundancy a basic feature of coherence itself. Cf. 
I. Bellert, who argues for “a necessary (though obviously not sufficient) condition of the coherence of a text 
consists, roughly speaking, in repetitions” (“On a Condition of the Coherence of Texts,” Semiotica 2/4 (1970): 
335–63 at 336). Cf. Beekman, Callow, and Kopesec: “In a semantic unit with coherence there will always be 
redundancy of referential information and/or the recurrence of information belonging to the same semantic or 
experiential domain. There may be obvious recurrences of referential information through such means as 
 
literature and Rabbinic literature are also replete with large and small-scale features that 
modern readers label ‘incoherency.’41  
 
Not all such criteria are to be given equal weight, as the authors of these handbooks emphasize. 
Some are more determinative than others. To take a particularly clear recent example, consider 
the following argumentation of J. Baden:  
 
Diversity of language and style, of genre, theme, and theology—none of these reach the 
tipping point, the moment when it is necessary to search for a literary-historical solution 
to the problems of the text. None of these render the text unreadable. […] From the very 
beginning the impetus for source-critical analysis, the reason that the text was considered 
so unreadable as to require a literary-historical solution, was always and ever the fact that 
the narrative, on the level of plot—who, what, when, where, why, and how—is self-
contradictory, repeatedly and incontrovertibly. It is not names for God that render the 
flood story unreadable, nor was that ever thought to be the case. It is the blatant 
contradictions in narrative claim at virtually every stage of the story.42 
 
Here the breaking point at which the search for unity must be abandoned is considered clear 
and indisputable. In particular, it is asserted as an incontrovertible fact that the biblical narrative 
is permanently self-contradictory on the level of plot, and this fact renders the text unreadable, 
a problem requiring a literary-critical solution. Given genuine differences of competent 
scholarly opinion regarding most of the textual examples cited, a more cautious representation 
might be to state that many literary-critical scholars throughout history find various aspects of 
                                               
repetition, the use of synonyms…, anaphora and cataphora…, overlay structures…, referential parallels, sandwich 
structures or inclusio…, chiastic structures (abba, abcba, etc.) and other devices” (The Semantic Structure of 
Written Communication, 21).    
41 See, for example, J. Neusner, Contours of Coherence in Rabbinic Judaism, 2 vols. (JSJSup 97; Leiden 
and Boston: Brill, 2005), 1: 11, 12–14; Samely et al., Profiling, 26–28, 147–212; K. Keim, Pirqei deRabbi Eliezer: 
Structure, Coherence, Intertextuality (AJEC 96; Leiden: Brill, 2017), 69, 71, 137–40. 
42 Baden continues: “It is not the differing theological views related to God’s position vis-à-vis the world 
that render Gen 1 and 2 impossible to read as being from a single hand. It is the narratively untenable sequence 
of events. It is not the differing emphases on priestly and prophetic authority that eliminate the possibility of 
reading Num 16 as a unified text. It is the utter confusion on the basic level of plot, of who is doing what where 
and when.” […] “The issue that demands a resolution—that demands a literary resolution in particular—is the 
issue of plot consistency.” (250) […] “Even scholars who are inclined to isolate the smallest literary units in the 
Pentateuch inevitably find that those smallest units are narratively coherent—indeed that coherence is one of the 
defining features of the smallest literary unit. The plot is fundamental; it is irreducible.” […] “Our text is sick, 
and that illness is exclusively the literary contradictions on the level of plot. This is the level we are operating on.” 
[…] (250) “If it is the contradictions in plot that drive us to the literary-historical analysis of the text—and that is 
the claim being put forward here—then it is only logical that our literary-historical solutions should also proceed 
on the basis of resolving those contradictions in plot. This is because, sensibly enough, if we try to divide the text 
on other grounds—terminological, stylistic, generic, thematic, theological—then we are not actually addressing 
the basic problem.” […] “Once the plot contradictions are resolved, if we are left with a narratively coherent text, 
that text can, like any text ancient or modern, accommodate stylistic and thematic and theological complexity. 
The reverse is not true: a stylistically or thematically or theologically uniform text cannot accommodate plot 
contradictions.” […] “What makes the Pentateuch unreadable is its thorough-going internally contradictory plot. 
The analysis that explains that unreadability is, by necessity, grounded in the resolution of those plot 
contradictions. That is why source criticism exists—that is why anyone ever thought to enter into this sort of 
analysis hundreds of years ago. And if one does not think the Pentateuch is fundamentally unreadable, then one 
ought to stop performing elective surgery on it.” (J. Baden, “Why is the Pentateuch Unreadable?—Or, Why Are 
We Doing This Anyway?” in The Formation of the Pentateuch [ed. J. Gertz et al; FAT 111; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2016, 243–51 at 251). 
 
the text incompatible with their expectations of coherence on the level of narrative logic.43 
Such scholars therefore consider it necessary to abandon the attempt to read the text together 
as an impossible (i.e. historically inappropriate) endeavor. Indeed, the methodological priority 
granted to the modern scholar’s experience of incoherence through the perceived disruption of 
logical consistency or “narrative flow” is, according to Baden, the only way of “responding 
authentically” to the text and for the analysis “retaining any degree of objectivity.”44 These 
same intuitive expectations of coherence are then taken as both warrant and means to critically 
reconstruct more acceptable unities, texts that conform to expected coherence standards and 
therefore prove more satisfying and make better sense. That the textual data can be divided and 
reorganized into more acceptably coherent unities is seen as confirmation of the correctness of 
the method. ‘It works.’  
A recent argument of Seth Sanders may also to be categorized under this rubric, insofar 
as it also assumes standards of coherence as given—though, he argues, not always 
maintained.45 In this piece, Sanders draws attention to the difference between the texts of the 
Pentateuch and ancient Near Eastern comparanda often seen as providing “empirical models.” 
He argues that the “interwoven” character of the pentateuchal text is distinctive not only by 
comparison with those texts,46 but also in comparison with its own underlying sources. This 
does not inspire doubt in documentary models. Rather, according to Sanders, it attests to a shift 
in the dominant “literary values” that took place over the course of the development of Hebrew 
literature. “For there to be highly coherent strands evident in the Pentateuch that have been 
interwoven, there needs to be one set of values that created the coherent strand, but a different 
later set of values that created the incoherent interwoven source.”47 Whereas the present texts 
are “radically incoherent” (though, Sanders notes, “still strangely readable”48) and exemplify 
the value of “comprehensiveness” by interweaving parallel accounts, their literary precursors 
(source documents) and successors (later harmonizations, rewritings, and commentaries) 
exemplify the value of “coherence.” Rather than taking the perceived differences as an 
indication that coherence expectations and the attendant notions of “unity” are themselves 
variable and contingent, changing along with time and culture, Sanders presents a model of 
historical development that traces the disappearance and subsequent reemergence of 
“coherence” as a literary value. In this way, coherence standards are implicitly regarded as 
                                               
43 See the formulation of Stackert: “Source-critical analysis of the Pentateuch is a response to frustrated 
attempts to achieve an intelligible reading of this text as a single, unified work. The procedure of contemporary 
pentateuchal source criticism thus ever recapitulates its historical origins: stymied efforts to read pentateuchal 
texts as unified compositions motivate alternative explanations of the texts’ geneses and compositional histories, 
including the identification of sources, strata, redaction, and compilation” (“Pentateuchal Coherence,” 253). Such 
frustrations are not necessarily modern, since they have been found among diverse readers throughout history. 
See among the contributions of the present volume especially Lyons, “Standards of Cohesion and Coherence: 
Evidence from Early Readers.”  
44 “The literary analysis of the Pentateuch is grounded in the basic inability to read the text as a whole, and 
that inability is not manifested in the variety of themes or style. […] Instead, what makes the reading of the 
Pentateuch problematic is its lack of narrative flow, and only by addressing this problem first and foremost can 
we be responding authentically to the text before us” (J. Baden, The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing 
the Documentary Hypothesis [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012] 30). “The separation of the literary 
analysis, on the grounds of narrative flow alone, from all other secondary considerations, be it theme, style, or 
potential historical setting, must be maintained if the analysis is to retain any degree of objectivity” (ibid., 31).  
45 S. Sanders, “What If There Aren’t Any Empirical Models for Pentateuchal Criticism?” in 
Contextualizing Israel’s Sacred Writings: Ancient Literacy, Orality, and Literary Production (ed. B. Schmidt; 
AIL 22; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2015) 281–304. 
46 “What we never find in Mesopotamian scholarly text-making is what virtually defines the Pentateuch: 
the interweaving of variant versions of parallel events” (ibid., 295). 
47 Ibid., 299. 
48 Ibid., 298; cf. 301. 
 
remaining more or less static across time, and therefore naturally available to scholarly intuition 
and judgment,49 even while acknowledging that those standards were, for a time, ignored or 
suppressed in favor of other literary goals.  
Critical procedures and judgments of the kinds represented by the array of scholars 
described here are predicated upon the assumption that what constitutes an intelligible, 
comprehensible, or readable whole in antiquity is somehow knowable (or already known) to 
the critic across historical and cultural distance.50 These intuited standards form the basis for 
diachronic analysis, and are what enables what is considered to be a genuine historical reading 
and objective reconstruction on the part of the critic, even while acknowledging that traditional 
readers throughout history have behaved otherwise with respect to the Hebrew Bible.51 For 
many scholars working under these assumptions, traditional attempts at reading for unity are 
to be categorically distinguished from legitimate historical readings (i.e. readings authentic to 
the compositional process itself). They are quarantined either under such labels as “midrash” 
or by characterizing them as the mistaken readings of those prone to natural errors and 
sloppiness, much like those attested by modern empirical reading studies.52  
 
2. Coherence standards are culturally contingent and must be learned. Other critical scholars 
emphasize instead that conceptions of unity and standards of coherence are culturally 
contingent and change over time. To the outsider, therefore, the standards must be learned; 
intuitions and coherence expectations of scholars must remain open to adjustment in 
accordance with the object of study, if they intend to understand it on its own terms, or to render 
an historically appropriate judgment.53 Among biblical scholars, perhaps the most outspoken 
proponent of this view in recent years has been Joshua Berman who frames the argument of 
his Inconsistency in the Torah as a foundational critique of source-critical method in 
particular.54 One may also mention in a similar vein the collection of essays on empirical 
                                               
49 Thus, Sanders argues, “critical scholars are not being really ‘anachronistic’ by ‘imposing their values’ 
on the biblical text—because the interweaving of two parallel variant plots was not a shared ancient Near Eastern 
literary value” (ibid., 294).  
50 “The forensic diachronic methodology at work here must assume that the standards of coherence of the 
modern reader are the same as those of the ancient text maker. Otherwise incoherence phenomena could not be 
interpreted as inadvertent clues to a secondary interference with the original shape of the text. This assumption in 
turn must be based on one of two beliefs. Either one holds that there is a fundamental cultural resemblance, for 
example by way of an historical continuity of text expectations, between Jewish antiquity and modern Western 
scholarly culture; or one believes that the modern-scholarly standards of coherence are universal. Otherwise, that 
is, if Jewish text makers and readers had different assumptions or habits of text coherence, they may not have seen 
as incoherent phenomena which we read as incoherent, and thus created texts that contained them from the start” 
(Samely, “Jewish Studies and Reading,” 766).  
51 “Yet even if the Pentateuch’s incomprehensibility is well established, having been demonstrated 
repeatedly in its various parts, it is also the case that for much of its history the Pentateuch has been understood 
as a unified text” (Stackert, “Pentateuchal Coherence,” 253). 
52 “Compositional analysis requires a cultivated resistance to the human impulse toward coherence, even 
as this drive was fundamental to the initial identification of sources and strata in the Pentateuch and continues to 
be so in contemporary compositional analysis” (Stackert, “Pentateuchal Coherence,” 268). 
53 The danger is not strictly anachronism per se, since some coherence standards intuitive to modern 
scholars may closely align with those of some ancient authors or periods but not others. See below at §2.2 (2).  
54 Berman, Inconsistency in the Torah. The following selections are representative: “The root of the 
problem…is that scholars have rooted their compositional theories for growth of the biblical text entirely in their 
own intuition of what constitutes literary unity” (3). Considering “inconsistencies” such as disparity of divine 
names and the Numeruswechsel, Berman concludes: “These examples serve as a warning flag for scholars looking 
to parse the text on the basis of their own notions of literary unity. The ancient text is a minefield of literary 
phenomena that are culturally dependent. The diachronic scholar who treads there based solely on his own modern 
notions of literary unity risks serious interpretive missteps” (4). “[T]he poetics of the Kadesh Poem demonstrate 
 
models by Person and Rezetko.55 Although not cited by any of these scholars, the historical-
methodological implication of this claim had previously been voiced with particular acuity in 
the work of Alexander Samely. As Samely states clearly, “The modern scholar has to reckon 
with the possibility that standards of coherence are historically contingent and that those 
embodied in the text under consideration are not yet known.”56 Yet such assertions regarding 
the cultural and historical contingency of standards of coherence and unity are in no way unique 
to biblical scholarship, but find support in a wide range of recent studies of diverse cultures 
                                               
that source critics read ancient texts employing anachronistic notions of consistency, which were not shared by 
ancient writers. Understanding ancient literary convention requires careful study. The conventions that guided the 
composition of ancient texts must be learned; they cannot be assumed” (54–55). “When biblicists hypothesize 
theories of textual development, they do so while situated in a distinctly modern textual culture, and thus are prone 
to project anachronistic attitudes and practices upon cultures at a great distance from them in time and place. 
Empirical models offer us methodological controls…” (202). “The irony of this hermeneutic is that it counters 
the very historicist ethos it seeks to embody. For all historicists of this period, literature is a product of a specific 
culture situated in a particular and individuated time and place. Conventions of coherence, of communication, and 
of literary production are all profoundly human constructs, and are themselves historically bound. We might have 
expected theorists—then and now—to sound a note of caution in adducing theories of textual composition. We 
might have expected investigators to be take [sic] cognizance of their own situatedness, and to be wary that their 
own cannons [sic] of coherence and of literary production could easily be anachronistically superimposed upon 
the cultures of yore. And yet we see virtually no awareness of these pitfalls in the scholarship of compositional 
theory of Hebrew scriptures up until quite recently” (222). “This raises the cardinal question: how do we know 
what constitutes an incongruity? Can we be certain that our notions of narrative consistency are equivalent to 
those of ancient writers?” (266) “There is no intuitive way to determine what constitutes a fissure in a text from 
another period and another locale. These sensitivities must be learned, and acquired by careful study. When claims 
for revision rely on perceived inconsistency or tension in the text and there is no external evidence to corroborate 
this perception, we may well be imposing modern canons of consistency on these ancient texts, effectively 
inventing the problem to which revision is the solution. A survey of six primers for source-critical methodology 
reveals a telling lacuna: all offer detailed examples of how to identify inconsistencies, tensions, and contradictions 
within the texts of the Torah as telltale signs of revision. But all assume that the modern exegete will be able to 
correctly flag these, on the basis of his or her own notion of consistency and literary unity. Not one of these 
primers suggests that competency in the writings of the ancient world is necessary in order to avoid anachronism. 
Not one cites an example of a seeming inconsistency, but one we know to overlook because of evidence from 
other ancient texts. I hope this volume has demonstrated the necessity of such controls on our work. Source critics 
will need to become aware of the situatedness of their own aesthetic sense of literary unity” (275). “Lacking a 
thorough knowledge of the ancient notions of literary unity, modern scholars perforce, perform their diachronic 
work in the dark, arriving at conclusions derived exclusively from their own notions of textual cohesion” (276). 
55 R. Person and R. Rezetko, Empirical Models Challenging Biblical Criticism (AIL 25; Atlanta: Society 
of Biblical Literature, 2016. “However, various contributors directly question the appropriateness of our modern 
notions of literary unity as a standard for discerning when the literary unity of an ancient text has been 
compromised.” […] “If our very notion of literary unity is anachronistic, then what we identify as discernible 
traces based on that anachronistic understanding not only does not provide some sort of objective means for 
identifying sources and redactional layers but at least in some cases misleads us in that very effort ” (29). They 
reference the contributions of Lemmelijn: “Our modern understanding of logicality need not square with that of 
the biblical authors and can often be extremely subjective” (132); Lenzi: “[W]hen an argument for revision relies 
exclusively on some inconsistency, tension, or contradiction within the text and there is no other evidence to 
corroborate this perception, we run the risk of imposing modern literary expectations on ancient texts and thereby 
inventing problems to which revision is the solution” (68) (Person and Rezetko, 29–30).  See also the recent 
review by Edward Greenstein of Gertz et al, The Formation of the Pentateuch (in RBL 01/2019), summarizing his 
earlier articles.  
56 Profiling, 25; see also his “Jewish Studies and Reading,” 766.  “[W]e have no access to readerly 
intuitions that come from the period of the texts. Our strongest intuitions on what makes sense or what is coherent 
in a text come from our own time and place…” (ibid., 17).  See further the discussion in §3.2 below.  
 
and literatures in the ancient world (e.g., Greece,57 Mesopotamia,58 in later rabbinic Judaism59), 
in the medieval and pre-modern world (e.g., in Islamic tradition60), as well as in other modern 
                                               
57 For ancient Greece, see, e.g., Heath, Unity in Greek Poetics: “If we are to make sense of texts from a 
remote culture, therefore, we cannot afford to take it for granted that our own expectations are applicable; we 
should try instead to reconstruct the assumptions, about unity or about any other aspect of a well-formed text, that 
are appropriate to a text of that kind in that culture. We must become conscious both of the content of our own 
systems of presupposition and preference, and of their contingent nature; and we must learn to recognize the 
distance between them and the presuppositions and preferences which determined the composition and original 
reception of the texts with which we are dealing” (2). “[T]he notion of ‘unity’ is, as we have stated, subject to 
historical and cultural change. It follows that if we wish to understand Greek texts we need to reconstruct, among 
other things, the constraints and ideals of coherence which informed their composition. This is an urgent task. 
Appeals to an ideal of unity or coherence frequently play a decisive role in exegetical reasoning about ancient 
literature, but there is little sign that any systematic reconstruction of the relevant aesthetic is being undertaken—
or even that the need for such a reconstructive effort has been adequately grasped” (3). “Therefore an interpreter 
sensitive to the historical mutability of taste should wish to explore the possibility that Greek literary practice 
worked with a concept of unity somewhat different from that at work in modern criticism” (9).  See also the classic 
essay of B. E. Perry, “The Early Greek Capacity for Viewing Things Separately,” Transactions and Proceedings 
of the American Philological Association 68 (1937): 403–27: “If modern habits of mind were the same as those 
of the pre–socratic Greeks, we should not often err in the interpretation of their literature and thought; but since 
the psychological differences between them and us are considerable, it frequently happens that modern critics, too 
much influenced by their own patterns of thought, either find something in early Greek literature that is not there, 
or else are puzzled and even disappointed by not finding there something which they feel ought to be there. Since 
this is so, it behoves us as interpreters to keep in view at all times, and in many different connections, those 
particular characteristics of the early Greek mind which can be recognized as such, and which stand in contrast to 
modern ways of thinking” (403). “What I have in mind might be further indicated by such captions as “the 
occasional disregard of logical, moral, or aesthetic sequence in early literature,” or “the triumph of parataxis over 
hypotaxis in thought as well as in grammar,” or “immediacy of interest in the early Greek mind,” or, more fully 
still, “the capacity for contemplating only one thing or one aspect of a thing or person at one time, purely for its 
own interest and without regard to the ulterior implications or associations that an early Greek narrator might 
indeed be concerned about, but often is not, and that a modern person with his more schematic habits of mind 
would almost inevitably bring in. I find abundant illustration of this in the language, mythology, religion, and life, 
as well as in the literature of early Greece” (404). 
58 For just a few examples selected at random of the recent, deep and wide-ranging discussions of the 
cultural contingencies of cognition, epistemology, rationality, logic, the representation of reality, reasoning 
strategies, organizational frameworks, literary competence, empirical science (and much more) in ancient 
Mesopotamia, see M. Van De Mieroop, Philosophy before the Greeks: The Pursuit of Truth in Ancient Babylonia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); A. Winitzer, Early Mesopotamian Divination Literature: Its 
Organizational Framework and Generative and Paradigmatic Characteristics (AMD 12; Leiden/Boston: Brill, 
2017); J. Borchhardt and E. Bleibtreu, „Aspektiv und Perspektiv in neuassyrischen Flachbild“ in Empirische 
Dimension Altorientalischer Forschungen (eds. G. Selz and K. Wagensonner; Vienna/Berlin: Lit, 2011), 477–
526;  F. Rochberg, Before Nature: Cuneiform Knowledge and the History of Science (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016) : “Indeed, our construal of cuneiform bodies of knowledge and their associated activities, 
as well as every aspect of the philosophy of such knowledge—epistemology, reasoning, causality, observation, 
explanation, and prediction—must be sensitive to its native conceptual grounds, the universe of cuneiform 
observation, interpretation, and prediction. In this regard, cuneiform knowledge tests our sensitivity to the limit” 
(14).  
59 See, e.g., the reflections of K. Keim: “Textual coherence is a theoretically and culturally problematic 
concept, in that coherence is to a degree in the eye of the beholder, and different textual cultures may perceive it 
in different ways. A text which to a reader from one textual culture may appear troublingly lacking in order and 
completeness, may not bother a reader from another culture from that point of view. In general rabbinic textual 
culture seems less concerned about coherence according to modern expectations and canons. One can, however, 
over-stress cultural differences, and it remains legitimate to pose to an ancient text like PRE questions about its 
unity, orderliness, and boundedness” (Pirqei deRabbi Eliezer, 69). Cf. Samely, Rabbinic Interpretation of 
Scripture in the Mishnah (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4: “[R]abbinic hermeneutics is not a derivative 
form of our hermeneutics—neither ‘philology’ nor ‘historiography.’ The first step towards an adequate historical 
 
academic fields, such as linguistics or philosophy.61 A particularly robust, wide-ranging, and 
instructive argument of this general point on the basis of the evidence of ancient Egypt, but 
with relevance for many ancient cultures before the “axial age,” is to be found in the work of 
the Egyptologist Emma Brunner-Traut.  
 
2.2 Perspectival and Aspectival Representation 
 
1. Emma Brunner-Traut. In her brilliant study Frühformen des Erkennens, Emma Brunner-
Traut draws a basic distinction between traditional Western modes of perception and 
representation, which she designates “perspectival,” and an “aspectival” mode characteristic 
of ancient cultures such as Egypt.62 Beginning with the striking example of the visual arts, 
Brunner-Traut brings forth an abundance of evidence illustrating a non-perspectival manner of 
aesthetic representation, arguing that “the method of observation used for Western art cannot 
be adopted at all for the study of Egyptian art … [W]e cannot understand Egyptian art from the 
outside, and must instead approach it through its own laws of thought.”63 Artistic representation 
in ancient Egypt is characterized by the sequential juxtaposition of relatively independent parts, 
or “aspects,” that must be mentally added together to form a whole.64 Brunner-Traut cites the 
formulation of Otto Friedrich Bollnow:  
 
Aspects, particularly when used in the plural, are only individual glimpses, in which a 
thing is represented from a particular viewpoint. In aspect lies a basic principle of order. 
Aspect always contains the idea that it is but one among others. Within it lies an instance 
of needing to be completed. It makes reference to these other aspects. Each is one-sided. 
In each, certain things emerge in sharper focus than in others and particular connections 
become clear. None lays claim to completeness. Indeed, how the individual aspects are 
unified into an overarching whole—and whether they can be unified at all—remain open.  
 
Brunner-Traut adds: “In the Aspective mode of apperception the respective results obtained 
from the various and diverse aspects remain openly juxtaposed; they are not harmonized in a 
closed system.”65  To illustrate, consider the following representations:  
                                               
understanding of rabbinic interpretation is to offer some resistance to describing it as a variation of what we 
ourselves do when doing historical scholarship.”  
60 T. Bauer, Die Kultur der Ambiguität. Eine andere Geschichte des Islams (Berlin: Verlag der 
Weltreligionen im Insel Verlag, 2011). Our thanks to Alexander Samely for bringing this work to our attention.  
61 “…surface structure, style, coherence conditions, themes, discourse types, meanings, and pragmatic and 
interactional functions are influenced by cultural background. Understanding a discourse according to these 
cultural strategies hence means that we relate all these levels and dimensions with what we know about the 
communicative features of the culture of the speaker. Marked (i.e., different culture) cultural strategies typically 
involve partial understanding. Most hearers or readers will only have limited knowledge about the other culture, 
so that sometimes guesses must be made about precise word meanings, coherence conditions, implicit beliefs, and 
pragmatic or interactional functions of the discourse” (Kintsch and van Dijk, Strategies of Discourse 
Comprehension, 81). On diverse, concurrent “logics” in philosophy, a plurality of logics, see H. Leisegang, 
Denkformen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928). 
62 E. Brunner-Traut, Frühformen des Erkennens am Beispiel Altägyptens (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1990). Brunner-Traut’s work is established on the foundation laid by H. Schäfer in his 
Principles of Egyptian Art (ed. E. Brunner-Traut; trans. J. Baines; Oxford: Clarendon, 1974). 
63 Brunner-Traut, “Epilogue-Aspective” in H. Schäfer, Egyptian Art , 421–46 at 422.   
64 Illustrated extensively in Schäfer, Principles of Egyptian Art. 
65 O. F. Bollnow: “Aspekte, zumal in der Mehrzahl gebraucht, sind nur einzelne Anblicke, in denen sich 
die Sache jeweils von einem bestimmten Gesichtspunkt aus ... darstellt. Im Aspekt liegt ein Ordnungsprinzip ... 
Im Aspekt ist immer enthalten, daß er einer unter anderen ... ist. Es liegt in ihm ein Moment der 
Ergänzungsbedürftigkeit. Er verwiest auf diese anderen Aspekte ... Jeder ist einseitig. In jedem treten bestimmte 
 
 
1. A New Kingdom Egyptian drawing of a compartmented bowl; 2. A contemporary 
perspectival drawing of the bowl empty, as found; 3. A contemporary perspectival 
representation of the bowl as filled; 4. “Reconstruction on the assumption that there 
were bowls with high divisions between the compartments”66  
 
                                               
Dinge schärfer hervor als in anderen und werden bestimmte Zusammenhänge deutlich... Keiner erhebt Anspruch 
auf Vollständigkeit. Ja, wie sich die einzelnen Aspekte zum übergreifenden Ganzen vereinigen und ob sie sich 
überhaupt vereinigen, bleibt offen.“ To which Brunner-Traut comments „Die unter verschiedenen Aspekten 
gewonnenen jeweiligen Ergebnisse bleiben bei aspektivischer Apperzeptionsweise offen nebeneinander stehen, 
werden nicht in einem geschlossenen System harmonisiert“ (Frühformen des Erkennens, 5). “According to my 
definition aspective is exclusively a mode of seeing opposite and in the presence of the object, not forwards or 
backwards in time, and not moving outside its boundaries. In particular, it does not relate the object, which it has 
separated in this way in space and time, to the totality of elements that constitute its real existence, and it does not 
link it functionally to another object, even in a causal relationship. This delimiting mode of seeing is completely 
orientated towards its object, so that it does not place it in a framework of causality that extends beyond it. The 
percept seems to remain flat in the plane in which it exists, without reference to what is in front or behind, to past 
or future. The boundary is the first and last criterion of aspective. By observing each part on its own, separating 
it from its environment and closing it off, aspective accords it independence. So any change is a leap from one 
individual, independent form to another, and not, as in perspective, a transition with functional connections which 
are subject to a more general law […] In this context it is significant that aspective, as it has no general law that 
encompasses everything and is raised to the level of abstraction, remains bound to the concrete object and directs 
its entire attention to it. The delimited part acquires independent values and is declared to be the agent of these 
values in so far as it has been selected and separated off; for the individual parts are in no way adopted in the work 
in such a way as to add up precisely and entirely to the whole” (“Epilogue-Aspective,” 430). 
66 From Schäfer, Principles of Egyptian Art, 355 fig. 329.  
 
The Egyptian drawing juxtaposes at least two aspects of this multipart object: a pure side view 
of the bowl and a view of the bowl from straight above. These one-sided aspects are not 
harmonized, but must be combined—added together—mentally. It is similarly instructive to 
compare the two portrayals of a pond, seen from directly above, with the persons in profile; 
and seen from above, with its surrounding trees in profile.67  
The paratactic juxtaposition of relatively independent parts which additively form 
unharmonized wholes and characterize Egyptian visual art, Brunner-Traut argues, is found 
again and again in other facets of Egyptian culture too: in the conception of the state and the 
ordering of society; in fields of science such as medicine and mathematics; in religion, 
language, history writing, and law. Found “in short, in the forms of representation and thought 
of all branches of culture” (70). This leads Brunner-Traut to her central thesis that the artistic 
distinctives of the ancient Egyptians and related cultures allow one to recognize “with virtual 
certainty” a basic behavioral mode. Again, this basic mode is that of the step-by-step cognizing 
of individual, graspable parts of a whole that have only been brought into a bi- or multi-lateral 
relationship, and from which individual parts the whole is composed in an additive (not 
synthetic, harmonized, integrated, or amalgamated) manner.  
A fine example is the conception of the human body.68 Although the body as a singular 
organism would seem a natural given, it is not understood as such in ancient Egypt. Rather, it 
is portrayed as a composite of relatively independent parts in the very same manner that arises 
from the conventions of figural representation in visual art: “Just as a differentiated object is 
not primarily recognized as a unity from an aspectival view, but rather is construed in a 
successive manner—i.e., as a juxtaposition of relatively independent parts—so also is the 
human body not understood as an organism, but as a composite of its members.”69 There is 
both connection and conflict among the parts.  
As with the human body, so also with conceptions of society as a whole. Society is the 
sum of individuals who are hierarchically oriented in relation to the king. But, like the organs 
in the human body, people are not understood as a mutually dependent, functional unity, except 
in the narrow boundaries of immediate family, neighborhood, or village.70  
Similar deductions are made in the field of Egyptian jurisprudence, in which there was 
no effort to produce a unified code of conduct: a contradiction-free, abstract articulation of 
general legal principles. Instead, ancient Egyptian legal texts represent compilations of rules 
and instructions, wherein individual cases are brought together in an associative manner 
without ever articulating clear general principles, or even necessarily reasons that are 
comprehensible and foreseeable for future applications. In such “aspectival” law, cases are 
juxtaposed even if they contradict one another. “In the place of the generally formulated and 
thus abstract law of today, among the ancients there was the analogical case, just as there was 
the paradigm in mathematics” (96).  
                                               
67 From Brunner-Traut, Frühformen des Erkennens, 20. 
68 Ibid., 71–81.  
69 Ibid., 71. Brunner-Traut considers a variety of evidence, ranging from vocabulary (the terminology that 
must stand in for the body, 72) to the treatment and handling of bodily parts in medicinal and burial practice, to 
the deification of the body, to love poetry, and beyond. This evidence demonstrates that such ideas as “that the 
body represents an anatomical–physiological functional unity,” or “that the organs are mutually dependent upon 
one another” are “far removed from the Egyptian conception” (73), which instead regards the body as “a number 
of parts that have been tied up or bound together” [...] “a sum of individual parts that can dis-integrate, as they do 
in a corpse; that can be held together as they should be in mummification, and as they were already ‘in the egg’” 
(72). A similar conception can be seen to underlie the conventions for aesthetic representation of multi-part objects 
in drawing (see the illustration of washing utensils on 23–24), allowing multiple options for expressing what is 
visible and invisible.  
70 Ibid., 82–93. 
 
 
Egyptian mathematics also operated in an aspectival manner, whereby highly complex 
problems were reduced to their component parts, parts graspable on their own, and then 
calculated in the most basic manner of addition.71  
In the conception of history, too, one observes an aspectival orientation. Ancient 
Egyptians construe history as a series of successive unities, but decisively not as a single 
temporal sequence that includes and runs through all time periods.72 “In principle, graspable 
individual events are juxtaposed as independent wholes, without concern for their genesis or 
mutual interconnection.”73   
From all of these forms of cultural knowledge and production, and several others not 
mentioned here (religion, language, literature), Brunner-Traut concludes that ancient Egyptians 
(and their intellectual peers) were very capable of thinking logically. The logic associated with 
aspectival thinking, however, is not the same as Aristotelian logic.74 Even if the latter standards 
are considered superior, one cannot impose them on ancient Egyptian cultural production 
without serious distortion and misunderstanding. Brunner-Traut also emphasizes along the way 
that “aspectival” cultures possess different strengths and competencies in comparison with 
modern Western cultures, among these, e.g., extraordinarily advanced abilities to think in 
analogical terms. In some of these respects, modern Western thinkers are massively deficient 
by comparison.  
 
Our purpose here is not to endorse or defend the correctness of Brunner-Traut’s description in 
all its details. We cite her argument here at some length as a powerful illustration of different 
coherence expectations in relation to the concept of “unity,” detailed across many branches of 
cultural production in ancient Egypt.75 It is precisely on the point of the expected relations 
between part and whole that aspectual and perspectival modes of perception and representation 
most profoundly differ. That we no longer have automatic access to the ‘laws’ of Egyptian art, 
any more than we have intuitive access to their ‘laws’ of history writing or their juridical theory, 
is an additional complicating factor. And yet, because there is a gulf between the aspective and 
                                               
71 Ibid., 129–140; cf. W.F. Reinecke, „Gedanken zur Herkunft der altägyptischen Mathematik“ 
Orientalische Literaturzeitung 86 (1991), 248–56. 
72 “As day follows night…so ancient ruler follows ancient ruler as executor of the same task” (99). 
“Geschichte war für den gesamten Alten Orient entscheidend Erfüllung von immerseienden mythischen Mustern. 
Für dieses Geschichtsbild was nicht die Einmaligkeit eines Ereignisses bestimmend, sondern das vorwiegend in 
der Natur erlebte Spiel der Wiederkehr, die rhythmische Wiederholung eines Typus, eines Modelfalles, orientiert 
an der Welt der Gestirne oder, wie gesagt, am täglichen Kreislauf der Sonne und wie im Wechsel von Tag und 
Nacht so an dem der Jahreszeiten, in Ägypten auch an der regelmäßigen Überschwemmung des Nils, allgemein 
am Werden und Vergehen der Vegetation und des Lebens überhaupt“ (100). Here, Brunner-Traut describes Israel 
as a major outlier in its conception of history. “In Israel ist...eine Geschichtsschreibung gelungen, die sich radikal 
von jener der damaligen Umwelt absetzt. Die anderen, Sumerer, Akkader, Ägypter, die Phönizier und selbst die 
am weitesten vorgepreschten Hethiter, sind am mythische Vorstellungsweisen gebunden, die ihnen zwar Annalen 
eingaben, kleinbogige Darstellungen von Einzelereignissen, Königschriften zumeist, doch keine Geschichte als 
ein die Zeiten umspannender, durchgehender Verlauf” (Frühformen des Erkennens, 100). 
73 Ibid., 156. 
74 Ibid., 158; cf. Reinecke, “Gedanken zur Herkunft der altägyptischen Mathematik,” 248 n. 4.  
75 For a similarly wide-ranging treatment, here under the conceptual rubric of “ambiguity” (by which is 
meant the tolerance for multiple, concurrent, and divergent conceptions within a culture) illustrated in the 
profoundly interrelated discourses of theology, law, literature, and love poetry within premodern Islam, see Bauer, 
Die Kultur der Ambiguität. According to Bauer, the cultivation of tolerance toward, and even valorization of, 
“ambiguity” that can be seen within various forms of cultural expression in premodern Islam stands in strong 
contrast to the hostility toward ambiguity (Ambiguitätsfeindlichkeit) characteristic of the European Enlightenment 
and its accompanying processes of rationalization.   
 
the perspective orientation, the standards of aspective representation have to be recovered 
inductively as a prelude to a proper appreciation of Egyptian culture. 
 
2. Modern Art. Granting all the differences between the perspectival and aspectival 
orientations, it is true that some facets of modern Western culture also adopt an aspective 
orientation that is not unlike Egyptian aspectual representation.  This is perhaps most evident 
in certain movements within the visual arts.76 As early as the 1820s, impressionism was 
reacting against the subordination of painting to relief sculpture in neo-classical art. Over the 
next hundred years a new outlook asserted itself, developed by various movements and 
priorities, counter-movements and rejoinders, all of which rebelled in their own ways against 
the tyranny of perspective-from-the-artist’s-eye.77  The first to break with traditional modes of 
perception were the Fauvist painters like Matisse, but it was the Cubism of Braque and Picasso 
that finally shattered the connection between natural structures and perceptions and visual 
representation, initiating what some have labeled a “new cognitive order.”78 
   
Picasso’s Woman with Raised Arms (1936), thought to have been inspired by the photographer 
Dora Maar and held currently at the Museo Picasso Málaga, offers a salient example of modern 
aspectival representation. 
 
                                               
76 Cf. Brunner-Traut, Frühformen des Erkennens, 4 for a periodization that includes a kind of “neo-
aspective” movement in the 20th century.  
77 H. H. Arnason, History of Modern Art: Painting, Sculpture, Architecture (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 
1968; 3d ed. 2013), 13–46. 
78 A. Ganteführer-Trier, Cubism (Köln: Taschen, 2004), 6. 
 
 
The many aspects of this painting—perspectives, lines, planes, colors, foci—cannot be overlaid 
or harmonized. Some contrast; some contradict; some are ambiguated. The various aspects of 
the woman’s form are viewed from different perspectives.  Her eyes and nostrils are viewed 
square–on, and yet the oval of her face is in three-quarter profile. At the same time, the way 
her body disappears suggests a point of view from above as she bends over backward. The 
curved lines and waving hair suggest movement, but the background panels hint that she is 
prone. (The relationship of her form to the background panels is unspecified, open to any 
number of interpretations.)  The curved and overlaid planes suggest depth, but the 
representation is also pressed flat by the spare, undetailed features and blocked solid colors. 
The color scheme, white hands and white crescent set within mainly blue and yellow color-
panels creates an obvious analogy between the woman and the moon with stars set in the sky. 
That the implicit sky is both day and night wrenches the image out of time. The black lines 
define everything sharply, except the herbals which blur and blend with the background. All 
these divergent aspects—square and oblique, still and moving, flat and contoured, woman and 
sky, day and night, sharp and blurred—cannot be harmonized or amalgamated into a single, 
perspectival image. They can be added together, but they cannot be synthesized. 
 
 
It would be inappropriate to judge cubist art from the standpoint of the logic and conventions 
of realist (perspectival) art, and yet many early 20th century critics did just that.79 A review 
from 1 May, 1911 in The Craftsman reads: “Picasso does not want to see nature, but how he 
feels about nature ... But if Picasso is sincerely revealing in his studies the way he feels about 
nature, it is hard to see why he is not a raving maniac, for anything more disjointed, 
disconnected, unrelated, unbeautiful than his presentation ... would be difficult to imagine.”  
 
Readers of ancient Jewish literature will be familiar with similar criticisms of ancient texts, 
which are declared “unreadable” because they are disjointed, disconnected, and unrelated. And 
yet, without access to ancient standards of unity and coherence, this displays no more 
sensitivity or understanding than did Picasso’s unnamed critic. We contend that one could no 
more declare a non-unified, non-harmonized, additive story-line from the Hebrew Bible to be 
“unreadable” than one could reasonably declare Picasso’s Woman with Upraised Arms 
“unviewable.” Before any judgement can be levied, ancient Jewish standards of (in)coherence 
must be recovered, in much the same way that Schäfer and Brunner-Traut have done for ancient 
Egyptian art. Once these standards are recovered, they will surely find analogues in modern 




Part 3. How do we Discern Ancient Standards of (In)coherence? 
 
If we accept the dual claim that one cannot assume coherence standards to be intuitive or 
universal nor can one assume the availability of perfect modern analogues to those standards, 
how can one arrive at appropriate standards in the case of ancient Jewish literature?  
 
3.1. Empirical Models 
 
One proposal is that represented by Joshua Berman, who argues that the way forward is to be 
found in more rigorous attention to ancient Near Eastern literature.80 Clearly the study of 
ancient Near Eastern literature is essential in multiple respects, and such comparisons are 
invaluable as far as they go. However, one wonders whether this material offers the kind of 
clear methodological controls and empirical validation that Berman asserts. On the one hand, 
it is questionable whether there are many genuine comparisons in the ancient world to what is 
                                               
79 “Picasso has no adherents, and we have to endure the brazenness of those who publicly assert in 
manifestos to be his adherents, and lead other reckless souls astray.” A. Salmon, Paris–Journal, 20 December, 
1910. 
80 “The root of the problem heretofore, according to this movement, is that scholars have rooted their 
compositional theories for growth of the biblical text entirely in their own intuition of what constitutes literary 
unity” (Inconsistency in the Torah, 3) “I seek to question our own notions of consistency and unity in a text, in 
light of what we discover from the writings of the ancient Near East…” (4) “Canvassing the textual culture of the 
ancient Near East affords us an awareness of the limitations of our own situatedness: we become aware of authorial 
and editorial practices that, standing as they do at great remove from our own, sometimes seem to us 
counterintuitive” (202).  
 
most characteristic of the compositions of the Hebrew Bible in their received forms.81 The 
ancient Near East lacks prophetic books, to cite just one example.  Moreover, scholars are in a 
similar position when reading, say, ancient Egyptian texts (to take his example of the Kadesh 
inscriptions of Ramses II) as we are when we read ancient Israelite texts. When confronted 
with incoherencies, there is no prima facie reason to assume that such texts were written ‘in 
one go’ or by one author. That similar incoherence phenomena may appear in the literatures of 
ancient Egypt and Israel (e.g., the so-called Numeruswechsel) does not itself demonstrate that 
such phenomena were characteristic of unitary authorship (regardless of whether 
Egyptologists have subjected the texts to redactional analysis as yet) or even that they were 
considered unproblematic in antiquity. In point of fact, if we assume that ancient readers and 
writers had different standards of (in)coherence, why would we assume that they had similar 
models of composition?82 As with any comparative enterprise, one must take into account both 
continuity and difference.83 In sum, properly evaluating the contribution that comparative 
material can make to the debate entails several layers of complexity.  
 
3.2 Inductive Text Analysis 
 
A different approach to the recovery of ancient literary conventions, including standards of 
(in)coherence, is represented by the TAPJLA project, the “Typology of Anonymous and 
Pseudepigraphic Jewish Literature of Antiquity, c. 200 BCE to c. 700 CE,” conducted at the 
University of Manchester from 2007–2012. TAPJLA undertook to “describe the literary 
characteristics of a large number of ancient documents important for the development of 
ancient Judaism and early Christianity.” The object was to draft ‘Profiles’ of the literary 
features of 328 works of ancient Jewish literature, providing scholars with detailed descriptions 
of the texts ‘as they are.’84 One of the major issues raised by the configuration of the TAPJLA 
project was the issue of (in)coherence.85 “Problematic literary structures, like discontinuities, 
internal contradictions, changes of perspective, and unexplained repetitions, are taken as 
important features to be noted and defined” (16). TAPJLA, though, deliberately avoided 
making any judgment about the origins or functions of any literary features, including patterns 
of (in)coherence. Rather: 
  
                                               
81 E.g., Seth Sanders, “What if there aren’t any Empirical Models?” On the question of the value of 
empirical models, e.g. David M. Carr, “‘Empirical’ Comparison and the Analysis of the Relationship of the 
Pentateuch and the Former Prophets,” in Pentateuch, Hexateuch, or Enneateuch: Identifying Literary Works in 
Genesis through Kings (eds. T. B. Dozeman, T. Römer, and K. Schmid [Atlanta: SBL, 2011), 73–95; idem., The 
Formation of the Hebrew Bible (New York: Oxford University Press, 20),  102–49; R. Kratz, “The Analysis of 
the Pentateuch: An Attempt to Overcome Barriers of Thinking,” ZAW 128/4 (2016): 529–61; M. Zahn, “Re-
examining Empirical Models: The Case of Exodus 13,” in Das Deuteronomium zwischen Pentateuch und 
deuteronomistischem Geschichtswerk (eds. E. Otto and R. Achenbach; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2004), 36–55. 
82 Berman himself sees this (at least at moments): “There is no intuitive way to determine what constitutes 
a fissure in a text from another period and another locale. These sensitivities must be learned, and acquired by 
careful study. When claims for revision rely on perceived inconsistency or tension in the text and there is no 
external evidence to corroborate this perception, we may well be imposing modern canons of consistency on these 
ancient texts, effectively inventing the problem to which revision is the solution” (Inconsistency, 275). 
83 Profiling, 25. 
84 The criteria by which texts were selected for the study are described in Profiling, 7–11. As a 
generalization, texts had to be (arguably) Jewish, complete (or nearly so), anonymous or pseudepigraphic, from 
the period c. 200 BCE–c. 700 CE, not canonical, and literary. The database of Profiles can be found at: 
http://literarydatabase.humanities.manchester.ac.uk. 
85 Discussed explicitly in Profiling at 16–18, 20–26, 26–28. 
 
They [the individual Profiles] provide an explicit, systematic, and comparative 
description of a text’s literary constitution and nothing else. They furnish no historical 
context, detective work on authorship, diachronic separation of earlier sources, 
editorship, philological criticism, exploitation for historical information, aesthetic, 
cultural, or theological appreciation, or religious appropriation.86  
 
The reason for taking such a decision had to do with matters of methodological integrity. 
Modern reading habits profoundly influence academic reading. “Our strongest intuitions on 
what makes sense or what is coherent in a text come from our own time and place, reader 
expectations that we learned before becoming scholars and which are reinforced by being 
scholars and writing academically.”87 And yet, there is no apparent reason to assume that 
modern reading and ancient reading are identical.  Modern readers have no access to readerly 
intuitions from ancient periods and cultures. As such, “there is a prima facie need for 
supplementing or educating our intuitions of coherence.”88 The only way to acquire culturally 
appropriate intuitions, while simultaneously avoiding the historical questions that attend 
comparative, empirical research, is to “scrutinize the large amount of available evidence of 
what texts are actually like.”89 In this way, scholars can build up temporally and culturally 
appropriate intuitions, even if those intuitions are imperfect. 
 
Alexander Samely, the principle investigator on TAPJLA, describes this as learning the “ways 
of the text”: 
 
For the critical reader who is not familiar with the ways of the text by virtue of shared 
cultural intuitions, the text itself has to become the primary evidence for its ways and its 
methods of coherence. And for the text to be able to testify to its own manner of 
textuality, the evidence of its boundaries is indispensable. The modern scholar has to 
reckon with the possibility that standards of coherence are historically contingent and 
that those embodied in the text under consideration are not yet known.90 
 
What this requires, initially anyway, is an upfront investment in the coherence of the texts 
under consideration. Alexander Samely again:  
 
For a limited period all close reading, including that of ancient sources by the modern 
critical scholar, has to invest up front in the coherence of the text. For the reader, in 
particular the reader encountering a text across a historical and cultural depth yet to be 
plumbed, must first acquire sufficient experience in the ways of the text before she or he 
has the ‘right’, so to speak, to stop looking for a text’s unity. The ways of the text cannot 
even be explored adequately without first investing in the text’s unity … So the ways of 
the text do not become visible without the expectation that it forms an internally complex 
but bounded whole, without investment in coherence. This is true in particular for texts 
whose ways are unfamiliar to the reader—the situation of the modern scholar reading 
ancient sources. The alternative, namely giving up on coherence too soon, is hard to 
remedy. Just as the expectation of coherence can be self-fulfilling for uncritical readers, 
                                               
86 Ibid., 12 
87 Ibid., 17 
88 Ibid., 28 
89 Ibid. 
90 Again, and crucially: this is the precise inversion of the methodological claim of W. Richter (see n. 28 
above); cf. Blum, “Synchronie,” 67. 
 
so the expectation of incoherence can be self-fulfilling for readers who give up too 
early.91  
 
It is essential to say that the approach proposed here does not entail any commitment to the 
unity or coherence of any variety of ancient Jewish literature. That one must begin with an 
investment in a text’s coherence does not mean that one will conclude that the texts are 
coherent. Expecting texts to make sense does not mean that those expectations cannot be 
frustrated decisively. An upfront investment in the coherence of the texts is a necessary starting 




A precondition of a better understanding of ancient Jewish literatures is the ability to transcend 
our intuitive and learned coherence assumptions when encountering texts from those other 
cultures and times. We propose that the approach that says or assumes that coherence standards 
are unchanging is untenable and unscientific. Further, so-called ‘empirical models’ are not a 
cure-all because we are in the same position of ignorance when reading and evaluating 
comparative evidence from antiquity as we are when reading Hebrew Bible and other ancient 
Jewish literatures. We are not making any assertion about what the standards of (in)coherence 
might have been in Jewish antiquity.  We are asserting that we cannot assume that we know 
them, and that the only way forward is investing up front in a text’s unity while undertaking a 
comprehensive analysis of the literature itself, learning the ‘ways of the text.’ Only then will 
we be in a position to offer educated, culturally appropriate deductions about the standards of 




Part 4. Moving Forward 
 
Obviously, we have offered nothing in this essay except an anatomy of issues and a proposal 
regarding the best way forward as we see it. Before next steps can be taken, it is essential to 
establish the relevant questions, questions that require further exploration and research. Many 
but not all of these questions reflect our interest in establishing the ‘ways of the text.’ Some 
are second-order questions that look further afield to raise comparative and diachronic issues, 
issues relevant to a wider historical understanding of ancient Jewish literature.  These questions 
can only be properly approached, we would assert, after an inductive, comprehensive analysis 
of the ancient Jewish literature itself, unprejudiced by our own standards and expectations of 
coherence. 
 
1.  Methodological questions.  What types of evidence might reveal something about ancient 
                                               
91 Ibid., 24–25. He continues: “The text’s boundaries must be allowed to define and limit the meaning 
options, in particular for the reader who is unfamiliar with the ways of the text. The factuality of boundaries is 
what permits the text to make sense in unexpected ways, but only if the reader takes them seriously … For the 
critical reader who is not familiar with the ways of the text by virtue of shared cultural intuitions, the text itself 
has to become the primary evidence for its ways and its methods of coherence. And for the text to be able to testify 
to its own manner of textuality, the evidence of its boundaries is indispensable. The modern scholar has to reckon 
with the possibility that standards of coherence are historically contingent and that those embodied in the text 
under consideration are not yet known.” […] “In the absence of reliable access to the text’s historical context, the 
factuality of what is inside it and what is absent from it, where it starts and where it ends, may be the text’s only 
defence against anachronistic expectations on the side of the modern scholarly reader” (ibid.). 
 
standards of literary (in)coherence? Is it fruitful to distinguish between expectations of 
coherence and tolerances of incoherence? That is, might certain types or occasions of 
incoherence be tolerated by ancient readers and writers while, simultaneously, being perceived 
to be incoherent? How might this be established? In what ways are the dominant methods of 
text-analysis practiced by modern scholars in alignment or nonalignment with ancient 
standards? When (if ever) is it reasonable to conclude that ancient Jewish writers had similar 
standards of textual (in)coherence to those of their predecessors, contemporaries, and 
successors in their own or neighboring cultures?   
 
2. Diachronic/Temporal questions: What can be said about the historical development of 
conceptions of (in)coherence within ancient Jewish literature and traced across its various 
cultural contexts? What continuities and what differences can be observed over time and space? 
(Perhaps differences are traceable through comparison of different iterations of a single 
tradition, different texts with overlapping subject matter, diachronically distinct textual levels 
within a single composite document, the literatures of different language groups, or a work and 
its composition-external reception, including translation?) 
  
3. Content/Subject Matter: Do coherence expectations differ according to the topics or 
concepts handled or according to how ideas are configured or presented?  For example, are 
there differences in standards of (in)coherence between different literary types (narrative 
versus sentence literature, versus prophetic oracles, versus prayers, versus treatises, etc.)? 
    
4. Nature and Scope of Compositional Activity: Are there different coherence expectations or 
tolerances associated with different types of compositional activity (e.g., aggregation versus 
deliberate and planned composition, writing versus rewriting, source text versus 
translation, etc.)?  Is it useful to distinguish between the coherence expectations appropriate to 
larger and smaller text-segments within a single work?  If so, what precisely is the nature of 
such a hierarchy, and how does it relate to axis 2 and axis 3 above? 
  
Considering the differences in time, place, and circumstance in which these texts were 
produced, a perfectly consistent account that can be systematized will prove impossible (or 
would be false if it were possible). Our hope is that these questions can serve as a starting point, 
to help us move toward a flexible model for understanding better the standards of (in)coherence 
in Jewish antiquity. 
